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The current Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (MTN) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the eighth such "round" since World War II, was
launched in September 1986. The primary push for the new
round came from the United States, which had an aggressive
agenda of improvements in international trade rules in intellec-
tual property, services, agriculture, investment, and dispute res-
olution. No direct mention was made of changes to the GATT
Antidumping Code in the Ministerial Declaration launching the
new round, although provision was made for a negotiating group
to review all of the so-called MTN Codes (including the An-
tidumping Code). In part, this reflected the fact that the United
States Government in 1985 and 1986, under severe political
pressure from import-competing industries in the United States
battered by effects of the overvalued United States dollar (which
were still being felt), was increasingly "tilting" antidumping law
to use it as a tool of industrial policy (e.g., the Semiconductor
Agreement) and administered protection in general.
Since then, much greater attention has been paid to an-
tidumping in the Uruguay Round. First, within the United
States, major big business groups - notably the Business
Roundtable and Emergency Committee for American Trade
-showed that they had the political clout to defeat further pro-
tectionist antidumping amendments during the process leading
to the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Mean-
while, several United States antidumping cases brought home
the reality to industrial users that they can be forced to pay
higher prices for imported and domestic goods, even where the
United States supplier either did not make some of the products
under investigation (bearings) or where the quality apparently
was not as good (micro disks and semiconductors). The implica-
tions for competitiveness of these industrial users, both overseas
and in the United States, of paying higher prices for inputs,
and/or buying lower quality components than their foreign com-
petitors was obvious.
Concurrently, the years 1986 through 1988 saw the first use
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of antidumping laws by countries as diverse as Brazil, Korea, Ar-
gentina, and Mexico. The Mexican example, in particular, at-
tracted much attention in the United States, and elsewhere, as
an example of what could happen in other industrializing coun-
tries. In 1985, Mexico began to substantially liberalize its econ-
omy by joining the GATT, reducing tariffs, and eliminating
many import license requirements. In December 1986, Mexico
effected an antidumping system, and instituted more than forty
cases over the next two years. The largest number of these ac-
tions were against products imported from the United States,
including such varied products as minicomputers, chemicals, and
paper cartons. Since Mexico's establishment of an antidumping
system, Columbia, Venezuela, and Peru have added new an-
tidumping laws and in 1991 Columbia initiated cases against the
European Communities and United States chemical exports.
During this same period, concern began growing in Europe
and elsewhere about the European Communities extension of its
antidumping rules to cover services and the use of European
Communities antidumping rules to impose local content
requirements.1
As a result of these developments, reform of the Antidump-
ing Code has become a major issue in the current Uruguay
Round negotiations.'
1. The European Communities began using its antidumping law as its main weapon
against Japanese, and later Korean, imports starting in 1984. In 1987, the European
Communities extended its rules to cover Japanese and Korean products assembled
within the European Communities, and then applied these regulations in at least two
cases to require European Communities content. One unexpected but interesting side
effect was to cause Japanese manufacturers operating in Europe to replace United
States-made semiconductors with European Communities-origin semiconductors in order
to satisfy the local content requirements.
2. From a longer historical perspective, it should not be surprising that Antidump-
ing Code revisions are once again "on the table." The very first General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade "Code" dealing with non-tariff measures was the 1967 Antidumping
Code negotiated during the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations (1963-67) as a result
of concern by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Communities with the
protectionist potential of United States antidumping law. The next round, the Tokyo
Round (1973-79), included a revision of the Antidumping Code; the European Communi-
ties had discovered the potential of antidumping rules as used to restrict imports -
mainly Eastern European and United States chemicals - and worked with the United
States to amend the Code to make application of antidumping duties easier. The sharp
increase in antidumping activity under the 1979 Code, and perceived abuses, has created
international pressures for a further revision, in the direction of a more moderate appli-
cation, of antidumping measures.
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II. THE ANTIDUMPING PROBLEM
There is a popular misconception that antidumping laws are
needed to prevent a foreign company, with large profits resulting
from protection of its home market by trade barriers, from using
those profits to sell its products in the United States at lower
prices than their United States competitors in an effort to de-
stroy the United States industry. Then the foreign company can
raise prices in the United States to exorbitant levels and recover
the profits it lost on its earlier low prices, and more.
The United States (and the European Communities) also
punish as dumping:
- Selling at the same price in both markets, if the two coun-
tries' exchange rates fluctuate at all, which most Western cur-
rencies have been doing since 1971, even if on average the two
exchange rates do not change over a period of time.
- Selling at the same price in both markets, if both prices go up
and down, as normally occurs in a free market, of course, even at
identical rates.
- Failure to raise prices if there is a recession in the importing
country. (This is probably not the course of action that Adam
Smith would have recommended to a business facing a drop in
demand for its product.)
- Failure to raise prices in the home market if there is a reces-
sion or other drop in demand, especially in a capital-intensive
industry.
How did the use of antidumping laws become so captured
by protectionist influences around the world? According to
GATT statistics, United States exporters are the subject of more
antidumping complaints under other countries' antidumping
laws than exporters from any other country. This has happened
because countries such as Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, Peru,
Venezuela, Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and others have not been re-
luctant to join the traditional users of antidumping protection,
the United States, the European Communities, Canada and
Australia.
The very first antidumping law, enacted by Canada in 1904,
was aimed at precisely the type of potentially anti-competitive
situation described previously. A large, monopolistic United
States steel producer (U.S. Steel, immediately after its creation
by J.P. Morgan in 1901) large enough to unload surplus produc-
tion at prices low enough to destroy the much smaller Canadian
industry, and then, after defeating its smaller Canadian compe-
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tition, raised its prices in Canada. In the United States, the deci-
sive event was a series of conservative court rulings in the 1910s
and 1920s which seemed to preclude United States antitrust
laws from reaching the activities of foreign monopolies, even if
the effects of those activities were felt in the United States. As a
result, the first United States antidumping law, enacted in 1916,
effectively replicated United States predatory pricing concepts
of the period by providing civil and criminal penalties for at-
tempts to destroy United States industries through unfairly low
prices.
The flaw in this legislation soon became evident. The stat-
ute required companies seeking protection to prove their case in
a neutral federal district court, applying the same sorts of stan-
dards that are applied to the companies domestic activities. This
flaw led to a new antidumping law which was enacted in 1921 by
the same Congress that added protectionist tariff increases. This
new law remedied the two flaws of the previous law by substitut-
ing the Secretary of the Treasury, a political officer, for the
courts, and, more importantly, explicitly setting forth a discrimi-
natory pricing standard to be used against foreign products.
While there were spurts of antidumping activity in the
United States during the 1920s and 1930s, this "double stan-
dard" did not matter too much as long as the Treasury Depart-
ment (which since World War II has not normally been inter-
ested in erecting protection barriers) was administering the law,
and especially in view of the overvaluation of the dollar from
1945 to 1971 (the higher the dollar relative to other currencies,
the less likelihood of dumping occurring). The big changes oc-
curred in the 1970s. First, in 1974 Congress added to the normal
GATT definition of dumping (prices in the export market lower
than prices in the home market) a "below-cost criterion" which
openly discriminated against foreign products, by requiring the
prices of foreign products to recover their full cost while United
States products are required (by United States antitrust laws) to
only recover their variable costs - a significant difference for
capital-intensive industries such as steel, chemicals, and elec-
tronics. Second, in 1979 Congress forced the transfer of the ad-
ministration of antidumping laws from the Treasury Depart-
ment to the Commerce Department, and effectively took away
any remaining Commerce Department discretion by providing
for full judicial review. The combination of increased discrimina-
tion in the statutory standard and reduced discretion led to the
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reliance by industries seeking protection on antidumping as "the
weapon of choice" in the United States (and numerous other
countries) as a way to avoid foreign competition in an era of de-
clining tariff and nontariff barriers, and declining transportation
and communication costs. The 1974 United States trade act also
set a pattern for future legislation: significant general trade lib-
eralization, offset, to the extent possible, by protectionist
amendments to the United States antidumping laws in each of
the 1979, 1984 and 1988 trade acts.
III. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
The most significant development in the current negotia-
tions was the submission in December 1989 of negotiating pro-
posals by Canada, Australia, Sweden, Finland, and Norway ad-
vocating substantial restrictions on the use of antidumping
duties, and the submission of a paper by the European Commu-
nities advocating a mixture of changes, some of which would
make imposition of antidumping duties easier and some more
difficult. This means that quite a significant group of countries
now favors significant restrictions on the current antidumping
practices, including Canada, Australia, the Nordics, possibly Po-
land and Hungary, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Japan, Swit-
zerland, Brazil, India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia. A number of these
countries started from fairly strong views that the entire concept
of the antidumping laws should be revised,3 but are now willing
to concede the impracticality of such a "zero-based" approach in
this Round, as long as significant changes can be made in cur-
rent practices.
The United States has so far taken the position that it is
unwilling to suggest changes in its own laws making the imposi-
tion of antidumping duties more difficult, but is willing to con-
sider changes if our laws or practices are (arguably) wrong, as
long as other countries are willing to act on the United States
proposals. The United States so far has demanded changes in
four areas:
1. a demand for a provision permitting measures to combat
circumvention of antidumping duties (such as by minor
changes in the imported product, or minor assembly in the im-
porting country, to escape the antidumping order);
3. Most independent scholars would prefer to see the alleged dumping problem
treated as part of competition policy.
1992]
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2. a proposal for added penalties for "multiple offenders;"
3. a proposal for greater transparency in other countries' an-
tidumping proceedings; and
4. a rather complex web of proposals aimed at "input dump-
ing," "third country dumping" and other forms of "evasion."
In many respects, the United States proposals are more im-
port restricting in principle than in practice/detail, so that the
elements of a "deal" with the larger group of countries are pre-
sent. The United States is well aware that its larger agenda for
the Uruguay Round - in particular intellectual property, in-
vestment, and services - means that an agreement on an-
tidumping that is acceptable to the developing countries will be
essential.
The European Communities are so far the most recalcitrant
about discussing changes to its antidumping practices. This Eu-
ropean Community position reflects strongly held feelings by
European Community Commission staff, and by frankly protec-
tionist elements in some member states, that the European
Communities antidumping law has proved an excellent tool
against Japanese, Korean, and East European imports, while the
Commission retains such wide flexibility in the administration of
its law that it can avoid major blowups with friendly countries
such as the United States. As noted above, excesses in the Euro-
pean Communities antidumping practice in recent years has
caused a strong reaction. There is now strong pressure from the
governments of Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Ireland for major changes to make the Euro-
pean Communities antidumping law less restrictive. It appears
that this position is increasingly shared by Vice-President An-
driessen, the European Communities Commissioner who is re-
sponsible for the antidumping service (he was formerly the Com-
missioner for Competition). Attitudes within the European
Communities are also being affected by constant and severe crit-
icism of the European Communities antidumping program by
influential media, notably The Financial Times and The Econo-
mist, and by the perception that some major businesses in the
United States and governments elsewhere are opposed to the
European Communities position.
IV. TIMING
The antidumping negotiations fall within Negotiating
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Group 8, which also includes a number of unrelated items (such
as import licensing, preshipping surveillance, and so on). Conse-
quently, the real negotiations have been done in an informal an-
tidumping group. The United States is pushing for a rapid reso-
lution of the antidumping issue, probably because of the call for
completion of all agreements by December 1991, but possibly
also because the United States has seen a steady erosion of its
bargaining position on antidumping, and expects more of the
same as developing countries gain greater expertise on the sub-
ject matter (and as "user countries," such as Canada and Aus-
tralia, that have "switched sides," lend their expertise to the ef-
fort and also as the United States loses GATT panels). The
likely result will be accelerated drafting, but no final agreement
is likely until just before the scheduled completion of the round
in December. A draft agreement much before December could
cause some awkward moments in the United States; once any
draft language is agreed to in Geneva, it becomes a target for
"pot shots" in the United States Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The sketchy outline of a deal on antidumping is discernible:
significant improvements in calculation methodology; weak im-
provement in standing requirements; some sort of "sunset" pro-
vision; and better transparency; together with some version of
the United States proposals on "anticircumvention."
The details of this package still must be filled in, both in
the remaining negotiations over the Code, and then again in im-
plementing legislation in the United States and other countries:
the details of cost calculation, cost methodology, and reforms in
the use of averaging and adjustments; the burden of persuasion
in "sunset" reviews; the degree to which multinational pricing
can be used; and de minimis levels for dumping margins and
import market share levels.
In addition, it is unclear if certain, more fundamental issues
will be dealt with at all, such as the rules to be applied to the
Eastern European countries; the relationship of antidumping
measures to "grey area" measures (e.g., "voluntary" restraint
agreements induced by threatened or actual antidumping cases);
and the degree to which normal business practices should be in-
cluded within the reach of the antidumping laws. Instead, it will
be necessary to wait until the "Berlin Round" (a likely site of
the next GATT Round after the Uruguay Round), for more ra-
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tional policymakers in the United States and Europe to accept,
in an increasingly global economy, that necessary rules against
unfair prices must apply equally to both foreigners and domes-
tic, or tit-for-tat antidumping duties can replace the tit-for-tat
tariffs or beggar-thy-neighbor subsidies of past trade conflicts.
